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ABSTRACT

This thesis identifies four periods of Russian youth policy, and discusses how President Vladimir
Putin's approach to youth and youth issues is markedly different than that of previous heads of
state, and that it has evolved even within his tenure. My content coding analysis of the Federal
Agency for Youth Affairs' 2013-2025 Strategy identifies the main values the Russian government
seeks to impart upon youth, and my analysis of public opinion surveys of youth provides evidence
that there is a connection between the 2013 Strategiia and youth attitudes and values.
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INTRODUCTION
“Only forward, only into the future!” These words from Russian President
Vladimir Putin appear right at the beginning of Russia’s youth policy strategy. While not
a particularly profound quote, it indicates Putin’s stamp of approval, and signifies
continual evolution including in the field of youth affairs. There has indeed been
evolution in the relationship between the Russian government and youth, and changes in
how this relationship is approached in policy. With my thesis I aim to answer the
question, how do the Russian government’s youth policies influence the value
orientations of the Putin Generation? I hypothesize that the Kremlin’s youth policies
seek to influence the value orientations of youth and emphasize patriotism, combat
population decline, and prepare them to be agents of economic growth.
This research is important as Russia’s current youth have grown up under the
leadership of President Vladimir Putin alone. Today’s generation of youth is markedly
different than prior generations because they are the first generation whose lives until this
point have almost entirely been lived under the leadership of Putin. That is the reason
why I am so interested in studying Putin’s current approach to youth and youth issues and
in examining how the value orientations of this generation are different than those of
prior generations.
As the Putin Generation comes of age and enters the workforce, there is little
understanding of the potential effects of Putin’s youth-shaping policies. Are Russia’s
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youth politically apathetic, or do they vote consistently and seek political change? Have
these generations’ minds been molded to continuously support the Kremlin through the
government’s attempts to foster strong patriotism and nationalist values? Do they value
contributing to the Russian economy and population growth? I aim to answer these
questions through analysis of government policy documents and popular opinion poll
data. It is important to understand the efficacy of Russia’s youth policy in terms of its
influence on the Putin generation for the national security interests of the United
States. As today’s youth come of age and become full members of Russian society, their
political interests and actions have the potential to support the longevity of Putin’s
regime, seek a more democratic society, or disengage from the political sphere. If youth
mentalities are indeed shaped to support the Kremlin, this poses a potential threat to the
political interests of the United States, because a large base of youth support for the Putin
regime could mean the long-term maintenance of a centralized, authoritarian state that
competes with the United States for international influence.
For the purpose of clarity, I define the state as all public institutions, such as the
schools, the military, and any other institutions in society that are not privately run. The
Russian government is part of the state, but not the entire state. When I mention the
government, I am referring to the executive power (Vladimir Putin and his executive
departments), the legislature (State Duma), and the courts. Within the Russian
government is the Federal Agency for Youth Affairs, which is charged with drafting and
implementing youth policy. The primary piece of legislation that I discuss, the 2013
Strategiia was passed by the Russian government, and then implemented throughout the
state.

6

I examined the Russian government’s youth policies in order to understand the
relationship between the state and the younger population, determine whether the
government sought to use this generation to bolster pro-Putin sentiment, whether the
government saw youth as having agency or not, and if they wanted youth to be actively
engaged in the political sphere. I originally sought to examine the “political engagement”
of Russian youth, but moved away from this Western term. Instead, I examined the data
through the lens of “attitudes and values,” my understanding of which is in line with that
of the World Values Survey.1 When a large portion of the population values things such
as “collectivism,” “strong leadership,” and “economic competitiveness,” they are in
alignment with the Kremlin and its actions. We cannot simply look to measures of
“political participation” such as voter turnout and participating in other democratic
processes, because elections in Russia have the sole purpose of demonstrating
patriotism. While it is certainly important to note the public ritual that is voting in
Russia, it is more valuable to examine survey data that pertains to the attitudes and values
that youth hold, and determine whether or not those align with the values presented in
youth policy. If there is congruence, we can conclude that youth indeed have adopted the
values that the government wants them to hold. While I cannot prove causation between
the policies and these public sentiments, I can demonstrate correlation between the two,
setting up further research into this area of the relationship between Russian youth and
their government.

1

World Values Survey, “Findings and Insights,” WVS,
https://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp?CMSID=Findings

7

Literature Review
The primary purpose of this project is to identify the relationship between today’s
Russian youth and the state. Scholars have studied the change in this relationship over
time, and I argue that President Vladimir Putin’s approach to youth policy is markedly
different than that of previous heads of state, and that it has evolved even within his
tenure. I argue that there are four periods of Russian youth policy, and will review
literature pertinent to the middle two periods (immediately poss-USSR into the 2000s,
and the early Putin years from the mid 2000s to 2012), as an introduction to my research
which is conducted on the fourth period, the Putin years from 2013 to today.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Putin took to exposing those who
grew up solely under his leadership to a different political engagement discourse and set
of policies. Jussi Lassila in his book The Quest for an Ideal Youth in Putin’s Russia II:
The Search for Distinctive Conformism in the Political Communication of Nashi, 20052009 provides an analysis of the state-youth relationship from the Soviet era through the
rise of Nashi. In the USSR, youth were seen as an essential element of society,
specifically as “constructors-of-communism” that had agency and were useful for
furthering the state’s goals.2 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, widespread chaos
extended to youth policy: there was no clear vision of youth, and no policies specific to
youth and youth issues. The policies that did exist saw youth as politically indifferent
and not useful in the political sphere, having a marginal position in contemporary

2

Jussi Lassila, The Quest for an Ideal Youth in Putin’s Russia II: The Search for Distinctive Conformism in the
Political Communication of Nashi, 2005-2009 (Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag, 2014), 30.
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society.3 Lassila argues that this changed significantly around 2005 with Putin’s creation
of the Nashi youth organization to counter the apoliticization of youth, increase their
political motivations, and implement patriotic values.4 This change marks the beginning
of the third period of youth policy that I identified.
Vladimir Putin’s approach to youth and youth issues was officially documented in
2006, with the publishing of the first official youth policy strategy document of his
regime. Douglas Blum in “Russian Youth Policy: Shaping the Nation-State’s Future”
explores the Russian Federation’s 2006-2016 youth strategy, and finds that the
government overall seeks to re-politicize young people in support of the Kremlin, seeing
the active participation of youth as essential to the nation-building process.5 The
Parliament and State council called for “taking the process of socialization of youth under
state control” and the Ministry of Education and Science’s youth affairs experts called for
involving youth in government-linked non-governmental organizations to develop
political engagement.6 Blum identifies the 2006-2016 state youth policy strategy’s three
overarching goals as follows: drawing youth into social practice to involve youth groups
in “productive endeavors” such as fostering youth creativity, increasing access to
technology in schools with the goal of producing more entrepreneurs and engineers, and
integrating invalids, orphans, migrants, addicts, ex-convicts more into society by giving
them fulfilling work and encouraging their political engagement.7 These objectives

3

Ibid, 32.
Ibid, 46.
5
Douglas W. Blum, “Russian Youth Policy: Shaping the Nation-State’s Future,” SAIS Review of
International Affairs 26, no.2 (2006): 95-108, 105.
6
Ibid, 98.
7
Ibid, 101-102.
4
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indicate the start of the process of re-politicizing youth, which eventually becomes
overtaken in focus by issues of economics in 2013.
Ivo Mijnssen, author of The Quest for an Ideal Youth in Putin’s Russia I: Back to
Our Future! History, Modernity, and Patriotism according to Nashi, 2005-2013
continues Lassila’s characterization of the relationship between Russian youth and the
state, extending it through 2013. He argues that “Nashi was founded as a vehicle for
counteracting perceived political instability in 2005,” and was utilized by the Putin
regime as a way to present a set of ideologies with which youth could identify.8 Its goals
were not only to quell political dissent in Russia, but to counteract it by providing a
generation of youth with patriotic education, and imparting on them an appreciation for
the government: “in this way, it was to mobilize a politically ambivalent youth in support
of the government.”9 Ultimately, these efforts were successful, as young Russians found
identity and belonging in Nashi (“Ours”), but the organization’s existence was shortlived. Mijnssen states that its demise was fueled by “decreasing political importance,
curtailed funding, and waning power to mobilize the masses.”10 Nashi was never able to
successfully rebrand itself and maintain influence in Rusisan society, and in 2013 its
leaders officially signaled its dissolution.11 With this organization’s failure, along with
perceived international threats to political stability in the country, Vladimir Putin was
faced with the task of reimagining his approach to youth. This marks the end of the third
period of Russian youth policy, and the beginning of the fourth.
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Ivo Mijnssen, The Quest for an Ideal Youth in Putin’s Russia I: Back to Our Future! History, Modernity, and
Patriotism according to Nashi, 2005-2013 (Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag, 2014), 177.
9
Ibid, 66.
10
Ibid, 182.
11
Ibid, 183.
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My work fits into the body of literature I have reviewed in this section because it
brings the discussion of youth relationships with the Russian government into years
beyond 2013, and examines policies more contemporary than those previously reviewed
(from Soviet times up until 2006). I go further than the ideas presented in these
books/articles by conducting a complete analysis of the 2013 youth policy strategy,
coding statement by statement, and objectively determining the values that the Russian
government seeks to impart on youth, and then establish a connection between this policy
and youth actual attitudes and values.

Methodology
This is a qualitative, content-analysis study of the effects of post-2012 youth
policy under President Vladimir Putin. In order to answer my research question, how do
the Russian government’s youth policies influence the value orientations of the Putin
generation, I examined Russian youth policies as my independent variable, and youth
values and opinions and political participation as my dependent variables. Primary
sources such as government policy documents, political participation data, and public
opinion survey data were key for my research.
The age range of “youth” varies across sources and countries. The United
Nations defines youth as between the ages of 15 and 24, whereas Russia’s Federal
Agency for Youth Affairs extends this range up to age 29. Accordingly, the Russian
government’s policies on youth and youth issues refer to those aged 15-29. Moreover,
other key primary sources that I use consider youth ages 15-30, and 14-29, so when I
reference youth in this report, I am generally referring to Russians aged 15-29, with some
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data extending down to age 14, and other data extending up to age 30. Youth on the
upper end of this range were less than ten years old when Vladimir Putin first came to
power. And those on the lower end of the range were born multiple years into his
regime.
On the policy side of things, I primarily examined the Russian government’s 2013
“STRATEGY: youth development in the Russian Federation for the period up to 2025”
from the Ministry of Education and Sciences. For greater context, I read their study of the
younger generations, including the Federal Agency for Youth Affairs’ lengthy document
titled “Youth of Russia 2000-2025: human capital development.” I identify the
overarching values that the Russian government seeks to impart on its youth, as well as
briefly compare the current policies with youth policies in previous generations. I did
this by coding for statements in Russia’s youth policy documents that pertain to certain
values and attitudes that the government indicates an intention to impart on youth. I
deductively and inductively coded the policy text with categories derived from public
opinion survey questions and response options, and added any additional categories that
arise throughout my policy analysis. The frequency of each coding unit indicates the
main values the Russian government seeks to impart, and the process allows me to
determine if there is a connection or disconnection between government intentions and
youth actual attitudes.
When contemplating how best to approach my research question, I decided to
take a more robust methodological approach than simply reading the text, and making
conclusions based on what statements and ideas struck me the most. I looked into the
work of the Manifesto Project and used their methodology as the basis of mine. The
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research group uses a set of numerical codes to analyze over one thousand political party
manifestos. Various ideological positions on topics such as foreign influence, the
military, human rights, democracy, economic structure, nationalism, education,
traditional morality, multiculturalism, and more are each assigned a corresponding
numerical value. Then, manifestos are thoroughly examined, and a code is assigned to
each statement in the text. This allows for comparative analysis between different
parties’ values and ideals. I decided to employ this coding methodology for my own
research, but used the results to identify the most salient values apparent in the policy,
without comparing them to others. Without needing to directly compare Strategiia with
other policies, like how the Manifesto Project does, I was able to inductively code, and
devise coding categories more detailed than those used by the Project. This ensured my
results were truly indicative of the sentiments expressed by the Russian government, and
allowed room for greater nuance in my results and discussion. The full list of my codes
can be found on page 21.
I started coding the text after first reading through it to gather a general sense of
the ideas and scope of the policy, in addition to completing other background reading on
the relationship between the Russian state and youth for further context. The document is
written entirely in Russian, and there is no official translation provided. Therefore, I had
to use my own understanding of the Russian language, and the assistance of online
Russian dictionaries to understand the meaning of the text, and thus accurately assign a
code for each statement. I kept a detailed account of my coding work, recording each
statement as written in the original text, the assigned code, the section and page location
of it in the policy, and any additional notes pertaining to language nuances. I then used
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Microsoft Excel to compile the frequency of each coding unit, and organized the data in a
pie chart. Additionally, I organized the codes into six broad categories, and present the
data in a simplified view for an at-a-glance understanding of the amount of text devoted
to improving youth policy, supporting youth individuality and agency, arts and society,
public services, encouraging traditional views and values, and economic
competitiveness. Both of these charts are included in Chapter One.
As for the dependent variables, I looked at surveys conducted that ask Russian
youth about their political beliefs, attitudes, and values. The Levada Center, a polling
and sociological research organization, in collaboration with Friedrick Ebert Stiftung
conducted lengthy surveys of Russian youth in 2019 about a variety of issues, and I
pulled data from their findings in “Russia’s Generation Z: Attitudes and Values” on a
wide variety of topics addressed in Strategiia. This organization is nongovernmental and
independent. The Russian Public Opinion Research Center, VCIOM, has only minimally
conducted polling on subjects pertaining to youth political involvement and participation,
and very rarely polls youth themselves. This government owned source does not provide
adequate data to be used in my study. This lack of information from the state is further
addressed in Chapter Two.
My aim in using opinion poll data was to identify a change in youth attitudes and
values over time, specifically before and after the publishing of the 2013
Strategiia. While causation cannot be concluded, as there are many other factors that
play a role in influencing youth opinions and values, understanding changes in youth
attitudes allows for a start in identifying the impacts of changes in youth policies and thus
the Russian government’s relationship to youth and approach to youth issues.
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Ultimately, I incorporated both qualitative and quantitative analysis into my
research, and aimed to establish a correlation between Russian government youth policies
and the value orientations of the Putin generation. If frequently appearing coding units
from the independent variable text align with high percentages of survey respondents
expressing those same attitudes and values, then I can demonstrate a connection between
government intentions and youth attitudes. Conversely, a disconnection might look like
political participation and survey data about youth attitudes and involvement showing
popular attitudes and values for which there are no corresponding indications in the
policies to impart.
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CHAPTER ONE: RUSSIAN YOUTH POLICY, THEN AND NOW
The relationship between the state and Russian youth has evolved over time,
fluctuating with different leaders and different time periods. My research identifies four
periods of youth policy: the Soviet period, the period immediately post-USSR and into
the early 2000s, the early Putin years from the mid 2000s to 2012, and the Putin years
from 2013 to today. In this chapter I briefly explore the evolution of this state-youth
relationship, paying particular attention to the change that occurred in the government’s
approach to youth in 2013, and analyzing the 2013 Youth Strategy that resulted. In order
to contextualize why this most recent approach to youth and youth issues is different, it is
important to understand what the state-youth relationship was like in the three prior
periods.
During the Soviet Union, this relationship was marked by a desire to use their
agency to further the state’s communist goals. Throughout Perestroika, youth were seen
by the government as “constructors-of-communism” who had the power to influence
socio-political discourse.12 However, following the USSR’s collapse, this relationship
drastically changed, and youth became absent from the state’s policy decisions and
goals. According to Jussi Lassila, author of The Quest for an Ideal Youth in Putin’s
Russia II, “ the youth policy practices of the 1990s can be seen as a continuation of the
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Lassila, The Quest, 33.
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crisis of the centralized Soviet youth policy that came onto the agenda during
perestroika.”13
After the collapse of the USSR, some people expressed a desire to stay grounded
in traditional Soviet values and constructs, while others wanted to develop the nation in
the direction of the West. This discrepancy meant that forming a cohesive national
identity and ideology was difficult and time-consuming. This chaos extended to issues of
youth and youth policy, presenting a challenge for the new Russian government. While
youth policy towards the end of the USSR had continued to move in the direction of
approaching youth issues with an understanding of their importance, wants, and needs,
the drastic political shifts in the 1990s interrupted this trajectory.14 The ongoing
transition from pure communist education to a greater focus on “self-fulfilment” came to
an abrupt halt, opening the door for an entire re-defining of the state-youth
relationship. No clear youth policy strategy was written, and policies that did address
youth represented younger generations as politically indifferent and not useful in the
political sphere.
During this second period is when Vladimir Putin first rose to power, in
1999. Initially, his regime’s approach to youth was to use them as a social and
ideological resource, in hopes of distancing “radical” narratives and centralizing proRussian sentiment. Putin was advertised as as much of a national symbol as the Kremlin,
the state flag, the Red Square in Moscow, and the national anthem.15 His strong-handed
leadership and image worked to captivate youth and bolster their patriotism, sense of
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Lassila, The Quest, 32.
Lassila, The Quest, 33.
15
Lassila, The Quest, 38.
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Russian identity, and support for the state. This defined relationship between youth and
the Russian state was officially outlined in 2006, when Putin’s government developed a
new national youth policy strategy. This document is drafted and published during the
third period of youth policy. Alina Levitskaya, Director of the Department for Youth
Policy, Education and Social Protection for Children at the time, explains the significance
of the Russian Governmental Decree No. 1760 as follows: “It was the first time in the
history of the country that a document was adopted, which defines the principles and
focal areas of state policy in one of the most important areas of the socio-economic
development of society,” which is youth.16 She states that the primary objective of state
youth policy is the “full development of the young persons’ potential in the interest of the
state.”17 This is said to be achieved by creating more opportunities for “successful
socialization and self-realization” of youth, and bolstering the development of their socioeconomic and cultural potential.
Throughout the policy, supporting youth self-realization in accordance to Russian
state interests is emphasized, by involving youth in activities and projects such as
“Russia’s Volunteer,” “Your success is up to you,” and “Young Family of
Russia.”18 Multiple of the discussed projects involve creating opportunities for youth to
come together and learn about how to develop their skills, abilities, and independence, as
well as obtain assistance with career and family planning. The projects are also focused
on recruiting youth to participate in “civic and socio-political life,” boosting the
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Alina Levitskaya, Youth Policy: A National Focus of Russia (Moscow: Ministry for Education and Science,
2007), 1.
17
Ibid, 1.
18
Ibid, 2.
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membership of youth organizations, and involving young people in some activities of
governmental bodies.19
President Vladimir Putin’s initial approach to youth policy was very focused on
developing “civic awareness” and a young “civil society.” Direct participation in
government and youth organizations was highly encouraged, and the policy was
implemented to facilitate these activities and boost their popularity and
membership.20 The Ministry for Education and Science specifically notes that existing
youth organizations (at the time) were concentrated in the largest Russian cities, and that
a goal of those implementing youth policy should be to address this uneven
distribution.21 Ultimately, Putin’s first set of youth policy was focused on developing
youth interest in state and societal activities, by bringing together young people from all
across Russia to join youth organizations, and take part in projects involving
governmental participation, career development, volunteer work, and appreciation for
“the values of Russian society.”
While President Putin’s youth policy from 2006 was intended to extend through
2016, mass anti-Putin protests in 2011-2012 caused the Russian government to alter its
approach. The state was worried that young people would be influenced by those
protesting in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. The Kremlin feared popular
radicalization of youth, and their potential ability to disrupt power structures. Putin’s
regime saw this as a problem, and deemed it necessary to define the relationship between
youth and state a little differently than before, because the approach drafted in 2006 had

19

Ibid, 3.
Ibid, 5.
21
Ibid, 6.
20
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not been entirely successful in the eyes of the government. Accordingly, Putin’s
approach to youth, youth problems, and youth policy was reworked, beginning the fourth
and current period of Rusisan youth policy.
The 2013 Strategiia has not yet been discussed in academia like the 2006 and
older policies have. Therefore, I conducted my own qualitative, content-analysis study of
the latest policy, and how the Russian government’s approach to youth and youth policy
has evolved during Putin’s regime. I modeled my approach on analysis found in the
Manifesto Project Database, which conducts a comparative content analysis of a wide
variety of political parties’ electoral manifestos, over 1000 from 1945 until today.22 The
project has a set of numerical codes that indicate various positions on topics such as
foreign influence, the military, human rights, democracy, economic structure,
nationalism, education, traditional morality, multiculturalism, and more. Manifestos are
then coded, statement by statement, with one of the three-digit numbers. This system
allows for consistent and objective understanding and comparison of various parties’
ideas and roles. Based on my knowledge of the Manifesto Project Group’s methodology,
and my background research about Russian youth policy, I came up with a preliminary
set of codes to apply to the 2013 Youth Strategy, and refined them as I went through the
document.
The codes are divided into two main categories: statements related to the political
sphere, Russian government, and traditional values (identified with a 1 as the first digit);
and statements in the field of socio-economics and culture (identified with a 2 as the first
digit). While the categories are not mutually exclusive, the loose division was applied to
22

Manifesto Project, “Project Description,” The Manifesto Project Database, https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/
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establish a baseline of organization within the list. As I began reading through the
Russian document in detail, I added codes inductively, to ensure that I recorded all values
and ideas presented in the policy, beyond what my background research led me to expect
to see. After completing my first pass, I refined the codes again, consolidating some
categories that were too specific (i.e. less than two mentions in the entire document), and
with another read through, ensured that no concepts were left out of my data chart. This
process was lengthy and difficult, but in the end my results are methodologically sound,
and representative of the content of the policy.23 My inductive approach to coding the
document meant that I accurately recorded that the vast majority of the policy is
concerned with developing the socio-economic potential of youth.

Figure 1: Coding Categories
100

Values/statements related to the political sphere/Russian government

105

Value traditional ethical worldview

110

Support (verbal, value-based) for young people’s involvement in the political
sphere

115

Support (tangible, hosting youth forums, opportunities for youth
policymaking) for young people’s involvement in the political sphere

115-A

Specifically involving youth in the process of drafting youth policy

120

Expand resources (people, financial) in the field of youth policy

135

Youth are impressionable, moldable

145

Positive image of prominent Russian figures, historical and contemporary

155

Value “patriotism” and national identity

160

Value “globalization”

23

Spreadsheet of detailed work provided upon request.
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170

Support and develop social media spaces for youth and promoting youth
issues, rapid information dissemination

180

Value/recognize the agency of youth, their uniqueness as a generation, their
individuality

185

Develop leadership potential of youth

190

Develop/encourage a positive outlook for Russia’s future

200

Values/statements that are socio-economic

205

Support for developing/expanding human capital; improve economic
“competitiveness;” developing skills and talents

210

Support for young entrepreneurship

215

Improve access to (quality) education and mentorship programs

220

Support individual choices in education and career path

225

Unemployment and housing assistance, access to public services

230

Support (verbal, value-based) for (young) families; encourage reproduction;
disdain for population decline

235

Support (financial, other tangible assistance) for young families

240

Value arts and culture

245

Support for health and wellness of youth (including anti-drugs programs etc,)

250

Other preparation for adulthood; critical thinking skills, etc.

255

Improve socio-cultural “competitiveness,” reduce social tension

260

Career guidance; increase job and volunteer opportunities for students

265

Recognize importance of labor migrants; support systems for them

270

Minimize emigration, retain highly skilled youth

280

Improve territorial mobility of youth, for both education and labor

290

Youth crime prevention

295

Value youth as a financial resource for state and society
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My qualitative analysis of the government’s 2013 Youth Strategy reveals that the
primary objective of the policy is to improve the economic competitiveness of Russian
youth. Figure 2 shows the frequency of each coding category. The code that comes up
most often is 205 - Support for developing/expanding human capital; improve economic
“competitiveness;” develop skills and talents. 16.1% of the 201 data points fell into this
category. Furthermore, four out of the top five coding categories fit into the broader
categorization of Economic Competitiveness (yellow). In addition to code 205, this
includes codes such as 215 - Improve access to quality education and mentorship
programs, 295 - Value youth as financial resource for state and society, and 230 Encourage reproduction; verbal/value-based support for young families; disdain for
population decline, each representing 9.0%, 5.0%, and 4.5% of the document,
respectively.

23
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Right from the beginning, the policy establishes the importance of boosting the
economic competitiveness of young people: “The strategy aims to expand opportunities
for the intensive growth of youth human capital by facilitating access to state and public
services in adolescence, developing their ability to make reasonable life decisions, and
seizing missed opportunities.”24 The document expands on the timeline of its goals by
explaining that youth policy for the medium- and long-term should shift from focusing on
quantitative goals--such as increasing inclusion and ensuring accessibility--to qualitative
goals such as increasing human capital and “productivity of young people as a social
subject.”25 This transition is important, the Russian government explains, because in an
increasingly globalized world, “the strategic advantage will be held by those countries
that can intensively develop, effectively accumulate and productively implement human
capital and innovative potential,” and specifying that “the main carrier of which is young
people.”26 Therefore, youth are identified as essential to the global economic growth of
the Russian country.
The Strategy emphasizes the need to improve economic competitiveness and
boost human capital with multiple pages devoted to explaining Russian GDP growth and
its economic standing in the world. The Ministry of Education and Science points out
that Russia’s global competitiveness ranking for 2013-2014 was 64th out of 148 countries
covered in the World Economic Forum’s study, among other ranking statistics from other
organizations.27 While I omitted these almost entirely numerical and statistical
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Ministry of Education and Science, STRATEGIIA: razvitiia molodezhi Rossiiskoi Federatsii na period do
2025 goda [STRATEGY: youth development in the Russian Federation for the period up to 2025] (Moscow,
2013), 2.
25
Ibid, 6.
26
Ibid, 4.
27
Ibid, 3.
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paragraphs from my coding analysis, this section of the text is still important to consider
when discussing the overall goals of the policy. This section examines globalization,
explains its positive and negative impacts, and discusses economic competition and how
it relates to a national, state, and cultural identity in an increasingly global world. This
analysis is used to set up a case for harnessing the manpower of youth, who are just
coming of age and entering the workforce, and using them to boost Russia’s global
economic standing, as well as increase the prowess of its cultural and national identity on
the world stage.
The Ministry often discusses the shortcomings of youth, citing rates of young
criminal activity, and claiming that youth currently lack professional and social
competency. Looking at Figure 3, we see that less than 10% of the statements coded
express support for the agency and individuality of youth and their abilities (blue). Most
notably, code 180 - Value and recognize the agency of youth, their uniqueness as a
generation, their individuality appears only 4 times in the text in total (2.0%). Instead,
the vast majority of the document expresses interest in merely using youth to carry out
large governmental objectives, due to younger generations being particularly
impressionable and moldable. Furthermore, much of the policy uses language that is
disdainful towards youth who are not acting in accordance to the government’s wishes,
such as those who wish to leave Russia and those who “lack social awareness,” as well as
expressing disappointment towards the entire generation for not increasing Russia’s birth
rate. The government is concerned about population decline and emigration, and doesn’t
hesitate to state this bluntly nor to blame these issues on today’s youth.
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The government’s relationship with youth has fluctuated between believing in
their usefulness and abilities as agents of change, specifically during Communism,
disregarding any potential use and capabilities they might have, and fearing their ability
to rise against the government. In Putin’s time, youth are once again given great
responsibility: “it is not enough to understand young people in the traditional sense, only
as the future of society.”28 This responsibility primarily takes the form of being “the
most valuable human resource for economic growth and ensuring the well-being of
generations.”29 This sentiment is found many times throughout, coming up in codes 295
- Value youth as financial resource for state and society and 205 - Support for improving
economic “competitiveness” of youth, 5.0% and 16.1% of the text respectively. The
bottom line here is that youth are a financial resource that, if engaged and supported
properly, will provide a strategic economic advantage for improving Russia’s economic
standing worldwide.
When statements in the broad category of supporting individuality and agency of
youth (blue) arise, which is less than 10% of the document, the end goal remains to
develop these core competencies and leadership potential in order for youth to bring
economic gains to the nation. Within this category, codes 210 - support young
entrepreneurship and 220 - support individual choices in education and career path
come up more frequently than 180 - value/recognize the agency of youth, their
uniqueness as a generation, their individuality and 185 - develop leadership
potential. This shows that even when discussing concepts that pertain to youth
individuality of choice and actions, the government places more value on developing
28
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uniqueness and personal interests in the fields of education, job training, and career
development, as opposed to encouraging independence, individuality, and leadership on a
generational level.
Looking deeper into the category of public services (teal), concerns about youth
socio-economic issues such as unemployment, health, and criminal activity are
recognized as important issues that need to be addressed. After discussing each issue and
its plans to combat it, the policy consistently justifies that such issues need to be
addressed in order to ensure development of the highest performing workforce. Again,
the primary goal in the eyes of the Russian government currently when it comes to youth
is to utilize generation Z as a vast resource of untapped economic potential, that can and
should be harnessed for the sole purpose of economic gain on the world scale. This is
markedly different from prior approaches to youth, which involved greater focus on
implementing youth programs and public campaigns to boost feelings of solidarity,
collectivity, and patriotism.
Statements under the broad category of Arts and Society (green) comprise 13.6%
of the document. This comes third, behind Economic Competitiveness (43.8%) and just
behind Public Services (14.1%). The main ideas that arise within this category include
boosting Russian culture, valuing the arts and traditional crafts, developing youth critical
thinking skills, and above all, improving the socio-cultural “competitiveness” of
youth. Much like how economic competitiveness is frequently emphasized, the
government also broadly expresses a need to increase both social and cultural
competitiveness of the young generation. This encompasses developing youth to be a
productive member of society, and reducing social tension. Tangibly, the Strategy
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recommends increasing inter-generational, intercultural, and inter-regional
communication through hosting youth forums. Similarly, with the world becoming
increasingly connected, the government addresses how social media platforms can be
used to support its goals, and indicates a desire to support and develop social media
spaces for youth and promoting youth issues, and to rapidly disseminate information
from the state to youth, through social media channels (170: 2.5%). Code 255 - improve
socio-cultural competitiveness, due to it’s more broad nature, encompasses 5.5% of the
youth policy document. In the words of the government, “ensuring the social
competitiveness of young people” is a foundational goal of the youth strategy.30 Such
statements are embedded in context such as, “the increase in the coverage of the young
generation with antisocial manifestations, and the number of offenses young people
commit exacerbates social tension in society, and creates a threat to the development of
the rule of law and the formation of civil society.”31 Overall, the Russian government is
concerned about the current state of civil society, and seeks for the population and
specifically youth to have more and better social interactions. These concepts relate
closely to ideas presented in the Public Services (teal) category, which is composed of
statements indicating tangible public support for homeless youth, youth involved in
crime, supporting the health and wellness of youth including anti-drug programs, and
supporting young labor migrants. Not only does the government seek to improve the
physical well-being of youth on an individual basis, it also seeks to improve social
relations within youth populations and between youth and the rest of society.
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In addition to indicating support for larger societal issues, Strategiia devotes a
significant portion of text to issues of family, birth rates, and population decline. The
main codes that capture the Russian government’s attention to young families are codes
230 - support (verbal, value-based) for young families; encourage reproduction; disdain
for population decline and 235 - support (tangible, financial) young families. These
codes are under the larger category of Economic Competitiveness (yellow), because the
end goal of supporting family development and increasing birth rates is to increase the
population and thus the economic output of the country. Code 230 represents 4.5% of the
policy, and code 235 represents 2.5%. Combining these shows that 7% of the policy
document--the government’s strategy for approaching youth and youth issues--is devoted
to supporting young families and combating population decline. This is significant, as
these issues encompass nearly the same amount of the text as statements in support of
youth individuality and agency. The Russian government has the following goals in this
area: “the formation of a positive attitude among young people to family and marriage...
formation of the image of a young family as a prosperous Russian young family that
carries out its life activities in a registered marriage, one that is focused on the birth and
upbringing of several children, and is engaged in their education and development on the
basis of the traditional Russian system of values and interaction between the spaces of
family, public and state education,”32 as well as to “stimulate the birth of second and
subsequent children, and the development of family forms of education.”33 It is clear that
not only does the Russian government want to support families to develop traditional
values and successful education, but also to emphasize the importance of having more
32
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children, specifically two or more. This section of the strategy indicates a desire to boost
the attractiveness of getting married and raising a family, and hopes that by providing
support to young families, that others will continue down this path.
Values and opinions are developed from family members, in addition to society at
large, and political leaders. Encouraging Traditional Views and Values (red)
encompasses 13.1% of the document. With my background research, I was surprised to
find that this comprised such a small portion of the policy, as prior iterations of youth
policy focused greatly on aspects of traditional value formation and developing
ideological support of the state. Codes in this section include 145 - develop positive
image of prominent Russian figures, historical and contemporary, 155 - value
“patriotism” and national identity, 190 - develop and encourage a positive outlook for
Russia’s future, and 105 - value traditional ethical worldview. In Russia, having a
traditional ethical worldview includes valuing citizenship, having a sense of moral
correctness, and having responsibility for one’s country, family, and career. This
sentiment encompasses more than patriotism alone. Statements with this code include
“Formation of youth’s holistic outlook (“view of the world”), based on the values of
patriotism, family, morality, lawfulness, healthy lifestyle, and respect for nature,”34 and
“maintenance and development of spiritual, moral and traditional family values.”35
Within the overarching category of encouraging traditional views and values,
code 155 represents the greatest share, at 3.5%. Developing “a sense of patriotism
among young people” is written multiple times throughout the document. Patriotism in
Russia includes support for the government and the Putin regime, Russian civilization,
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and Russian culture, as well as developing a desire to serve in the Armed Forces, and
develop a sense of “love for the Motherland” and “pride in the history of the
Fatherland.”36 Another concept within this category is the idea that youth are
impressionable and moldable. Youth are given the responsibility of being the future of
society, and the policy indicates clearly that youth are not yet capable of doing so
satisfactorily. The text spends a lot of time talking about how youth in their current state
lack a lot of skills, and that youth need direction in their life. Without this direction from
the state and families, it is explained that youth have either limited or no goals in mind
for their future. The text states: “The processes taking place in the youth environment of
Russia are very contradictory, ambiguous, and sometimes multidirectional...Young
people take a very ambiguous position on their political orientations...Against the
background of the reforms of recent years, there have been important shifts in the public
consciousness of young people.”37 This ambiguity is then presented as a responsibility of
and an opportunity for the state to develop these positions and values. The state
understands youth as “not a self-developing system,” that throughout their lives they are
exposed to a variety of socio-economic and political conditions that have the power to
shape them.38 Accordingly, youth carry “the past, present, and future,” as they adopt
views from their grandparents who lived during the height of the USSR, from their
parents, and from current societal happenings. Looking towards the future, the state
seeks to have a hand in this development in the present times so that as this developing
generation of Russians enter the workforce and eventually become political leaders, carry
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on the government’s values and goals. Adolescence is a crucial time period in which
youth mentalities and values can be molded and shaped, and the youth strategy
approaches this with the view that there is a problem with youth behaviors and
ambiguity, which can and should be remedied by a prescribed sense of direction. This is
presented as a mutually beneficial situation, with youth benefitting from guidance, and
the state benefitting from orienting them to traditional Russian values.
Moving on, I’ll briefly discuss the category of Improving Youth Policy
(purple). Indications for improving youth policy and initiatives include increasing
education and training for people who work in this field, as well as increasing financial
support, especially from sources external to the state. Strategiia discusses multiple times
a desire to bolster a public-private partnership in funding youth policy and youth
initiatives and activities. These statements fall under the category of code 120 - expand
resources (people, financial) in the field of youth policy, which comes up in 2.5% of the
policy. This overarching (purple) category also includes indications for increasing
opportunities for youth themselves to become involved in the youth policy-making
progress (115-A: 1.5%), and/or join in on other political forums and initiatives (codes
110, 115 combined: 2%).
Overall, the results of my text analysis show that the main goal of the current
Russian youth policy strategy is to develop the economic potential of youth, by means of
education, career guidance, and job training. The goal of using Russia’s youngest
generation to support the economic growth of the country is also supported by secondary
goals such as boosting patriotic feelings, stimulating marriage and birth rates, retaining
talented youth in the country, developing youth’s positive view of Russia’s history and
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future potential, decreasing social tensions, and providing public services to decrease
youth criminality, improve their physical health, and decrease youth
homelessness. While many of these ideas may not initially appear directly related to the
primary goal of boosting the Putin Generation’s human capital potential, these social
programs and values are used to develop a healthy, ever-growing youth population with
values in line with the government’s, which in turn can become a large, motivated,
skilled workforce.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE EVOLUTION OF YOUTH ATTITUDES AND VALUES

After conducting my content analysis of the 2013 Youth Strategy, I turned my
research efforts to the dependent variable, youth actual attitudes and values. With a
knowledge of the Russian government’s main goals in the field of youth and youth
issues, I identified key sociological studies that asked youth questions about their values
and beliefs across topics in line with those discussed in the Kremlin’s policy. This
enabled me to identify changes in youth attitudes and values over time, and thus establish
areas of connection and disconnection between these changes and Strategiia.

Background Information on the Sociology of Youth
At the same time as governmental approaches towards youth and youth issues
evolved throughout the USSR and post-Soviet Russia, the academic discipline of
sociology, and the sociology of youth in particular, experienced rapid development. My
research draws upon arguments presented by previous scholars about the Russian
government’s approach to youth, and builds upon them by analyzing the most recent
youth policy, as well as attitudes and values of the current young generations.
Russian sociology first emerged in the 1950s. Dmitri Shalin explains the
development of Soviet sociology across three time periods. The first period is from 1956
to 1964, when the first sociological centers were established, led by Soviet philosophers
who had to turn to using empirical research, instead of just abstract analysis and thought,
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in order to be recognized as legitimate. Shalin argues that Soviet sociology had its roots
in Marxist theories, but that the goal was to adjust it to the realities of the modern
world.39 In the next time period, the term “sociological research” was introduced, and the
fact-gathering work of social research was differentiated from purely theoretical
studies. There was also a shift away from Marxist sociological theory, as the goals of
sociology evolved to be more focused on “historical materialism.”40 As Soviet sociology
became more focused on concrete research, the legitimacy of the field increased. The
first official research studies took place in the early 1960s, including the first opinion poll
of youth. People recognized that in a socialist society, social problems exist, and those
problems must be identified and properly addressed. Beginning in 1970, Soviet
sociology became a lot more academic and legitimate, with the Sociological Research
journal established in 1974, and a reorganization of leadership within the Institute of
Sociology. At this time, Soviet sociology was officially institutionalized and recognized
as an academic discipline and profession.41 From this point forward, surveys became
more sophisticated, and methods of research more consistent.
Zubok and Chuprov examine the founding and development of the sociology of
youth in Russia. They argue that youth and youth issues have always been of importance
to Soviet sociology, pointing out that the Sociology Group under the Central Committee
of the Komsomol was established in 1964, a process led by young scientists. Zubok and
Chuprov argue that the “Young People and Socialism” conference held in 1967 was a
crucial milestone in establishing the sociology of youth. Scientists of various

39

Dmitri N. Shalin, “The Development of Soviet Sociology, 1956-1976,” Annual Review of Sociology 4
(1978): 171-191, 172-174.
40
Ibid, 177.
41
Ibid, 184.

37

backgrounds and with various theoretical approaches came together and identified key
areas of research: “the shaping of worldview; the development of the personality of the
young individual; young people’s active civic and political involvement; expansion of the
rights of young people and their participation in the administration of the affairs of
society and the state; leisure activity and physical development; and the specific problems
of young people on the job, in rural areas, and in school and college.”42 These are the
same topics that are researched today.
During the period of Perestroika in the mid 1980s, researching the problems of
young people and their place in society was emphasized. Zubok and Chuprov argue that
the sociological definition of the term and concept of youth, which originated in the 80s,
is as follows:
“The term “youth” is utilized in the meaning of the youth subculture. Moreover,
emphasis is placed on the particular form of organization of young people that
determines the style of their life and thinking, distinguished by specific norms,
values, and patterns of behavior. The grounds for defining the youth subculture as
an object of social influence on the part of public institutions were seen in young
people’s tendency to be in opposition (although not necessarily a stance of
hostility) toward the worldview of the older generations, as well as particular
styles of behavior, outward appearance, ways of spending leisure time, and so
on.”43
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During the 90s, young people were studied particularly as “agents of social relations,”
whose “social subjecthood” was studied, in the interest of understanding their strategies
for adapting to and solving social challenges, and understanding their place in the social
organization of society.44 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, sociological research
experienced drastically less funding. At the same time, the lack of ideological control in
the field allowed research to expand into new territory and more creative ideas. From the
period of 1995 to 2000, more than 40 surveys were carried out nationwide to study the
problems of young people in work, daily life, education, and leisure. The field of
sociology became more mature and comprehensive, because of the accumulation of
knowledge over time, and the international recognition of various textbooks, methods,
and institutes.
Ultimately, the same ideas and topics that were researched in the 1950s and 60s at
the origins of Soviet sociology are still being researched today. My research takes a
comprehensive look at the evolution of both youth policy and youth sociological polling
in Russia, building on the understanding of these concepts throughout time, and
examining the shift after 2012.
Examination of Primary Sources
In order to determine whether there exists a correlation between the 2013 Youth
Strategy and Russian youth attitudes and values, I examined a series of public opinion
surveys conducted both before and after the policy was created. Because the Russian
government seeks to directly influence the values and goals of youth, correlation can be
established by observing changes in such values and goals over time. I had originally
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intended to utilize data from VCIOM (Russia Public Opinion Research Center), a widely
known state-owned polling company, to provide insight into differences between how the
Russian government and other organizations interpret the current state of youth
opinions. However, I discovered that VCIOM markedly lacks polling data in this
area. Most significantly, whenever surveys are indeed conducted about topics such as
youth involvement in politics, which is infrequent, the respondents are not actually young
people. Instead, older members of society are polled about their opinions on things such
as their children and grandchildren joining youth organizations.45
This is notable because it signifies that VCIOM, and by extension the Russian
government, is minimally interested in understanding youth attitudes, values, and
behaviors from the point of view of younger generations themselves. Instead, the state is
more interested in quantitative information about youth unemployment, marriage rates,
and their contribution to the national economy. It is therefore of more interest to Putin’s
regime to develop youth policies that focus on utilizing the characteristic of moldability
that it assigns to youth to shape them into productive members of society and the
economy. This is as opposed to a more humanistic approach of seeking to understand the
opinions of youth and how they think, and using their views to help determine how they
can best be supported. Ultimately, the lack of data collected by this prominent stateowned polling agency supports the conclusion that the Russian government sees youth as
object rather than subject.
One of the most prominent Russian sociologists is Yuri Levada, who founded the
Levada Center, an independent, nongovernmental sociological research and polling
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organization. Levada began studies of youth in the 1960s, but throughout his lifetime
was consistently scrutinized by the Russian government. In fact, under Russian law, the
Levada Center is designated as a foreign agent.46 Despite Levada’s censorship and
scrutiny, he and others still sought to conduct comprehensive research, including polling
youth, which the Russian government notably has not done. Public opinion surveying is
used by the Russian state more as a tool of presenting and confirming traditional
ideologies, especially those of older generations, similar to how voting in recent times is
more of a public ritual and an exercise in expressing popular support for Putin, regardless
of the particular issue on the ballot.47
The improvement in sociological methods and surveying techniques can be noted
in the differences between the youth opinion polls I analyze in this chapter. The first
poll, conducted in 1961, asked open-ended questions, such as “what is your opinion of
your generation; are you satisfied with its activities and the way it handles itself?” and
“do you personally have a goal in life; what is it; what must you do to reach it; do you
believe you will attain your goal; on what do you base your conviction?”48 These
questions were published by the Institute of Public Opinion in the youth newspaper
Komsomolskaya Pravda, which reaches an audience of youth ages 15 to 30, and
responses were sent in by mail. Chikin and Grushin’s write-up of the results
characterizes youth based on the respondent’s answers to questions in the fields of
education, career, social status, upbringing, geographical location, and self-
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satisfaction. Overall, the study finds that the ten main characteristics of youth are:
“patriotism, love of country; devotion to the Party, moral strength; moral traits:
willpower, courage, honesty, steadfastness, heroism; a thirst for knowledge;
industriousness; faith in communism; collectivism; participation in activities; a feeling
for the new; aspiration toward peace.”49 While these traits and values are still
emphasized in youth policy today, the salience of each trait has varied over time. Most
notably, the Russian state’s focus on youth has shifted away from primarily using youth
as an ideological resource, to instead devoting more attention and resources to boosting
the economic potential of the youngest generations. Chikin and Grushin conclude that
the poll reveals that Soviet youth have a sense of purpose and a confidence in the nation’s
future, and that the poll “testifies to the conviction that the work initiated by the fathers-the building of communism--will soon be completed by the sons.”50
As my research identifies a distinct shift in youth policy in 2013, I identified two
primary sources that my findings in this chapter come from, both of which are
comprehensive surveys of youth values, attitudes, problems, and aspirations. The first
report was published in 2011, and the second set of surveys conducted in 2019 and
published in 2020. Both sets of opinion polls were carried out by researchers with the
Levada Center, which allows for comparison between youth attitudes and values preStrategiia, and post-Strategiia. With similar questions being asked two years before, and
six years after the most recent Russian youth policy strategy, I can evaluate changes in
ideology over time, and along with the data from Chapter One, determine the correlation,
or lack thereof, between the policy’s goals, and youth actual opinions. With a large
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number of other variables influencing youth attitudes and values, I cannot conclude
causation from this study alone. However, I can identify a connection between
government intentions and changes in youth beliefs. As with the large categories I
established in Chapter One, I organized the findings from these studies into the following
groups: Arts and Society, Economic - Career, Economic - Education, Economic Population Concerns, Individuality and Agency, Political Involvement, and Traditional
Values. This division allows for coordinated comparison between the 2011 and 2019
opinion poll data, and a clear discussion of correlation between changes in youth attitudes
and the 2013 Strategiia.
Gudkov, Dubin, and Zorkaya’s study entitled Molodeszh Rossii was published in
2011. Within the 8 years between this study and the most recent one conducted with FES,
there have been changes in sociological approaches to polling youth, notably in the way
questions and answer options are presented and phrased. For example, Molodezh Rossii
asks “How do you feel about the idea of ‘Russia is for Russians’?” and Generation Z
Attitudes and Values asks, “How much do you agree with the statement, ‘Real Russians
are only those who have Russian blood in their veins’?” and “How much do you agree
with the statement, ‘It would be best if Russia was inhabited by Russians only’?” In
2019, respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement on a scale of 1 to 5,
with 1 being strongly disagree and 5 being strongly agree. This is a far more neutral
approach, compared to the 2011 answer options which are as follows: “I support it, it is
high time to implement it; It would be nice to implement it, but within reasonable limits;
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Negative, this is actual fascism; This does not interest me; I find it difficult to
answer.”51
Discussion of Survey Results
With the main focus of the 2013 Strategiia being to boost the economic
competitiveness of youth, survey questions within the category of economics are the most
important to examine. Strategiia frequently cites the importance of improving
educational opportunities to best prepare youth for the workforce. In 2011, youth
responded to Levada’s polls about the quality of the education they’ve currently received
as follows: 42% said they were “rather satisfied,” 31% “completely satisfied,” and 20%
“rather not satisfied,” with only 5% saying they were “completely not satisfied,” and 3%
finding it difficult to answer.52 In 1998, youth answered similarly, but with the greatest
share of respondents (36%) selecting “rather not satisfied,” 22% “completely satisfied,”
and 28% “rather satisfied.”53 Between these years, sentiments were consistent, but in
2019, youth opinions changed. In Levada’s newest study, 46% of youth believed that
training, school, and university education are “poorly adapted” to the current world of
work, and 45% saying education is “well adapted.”54 Therefore, youth satisfaction with
education has decreased over the course of Putin’s regime, and specifically between 2011
and 2019. This negatively correlates with the government’s written approach to
education, and suggests that its aims to improve the quality and availability of education
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and training programs have not been as successful as planned, in the eyes of their target
generation.
If Putin’s 2013 policy effectively influenced youth to be more interested in having
a successful career and thus contribute greatly to the Russian economy, we would see a
corresponding increase in such sentiments in opinion poll results. In 2011, 60% of youth
indicated that they were not satisfied with opportunities for earning money, getting a
good job, and/or starting their own business.55 They also indicated that the most key
factors of success in life are knowing people, having a good education, and having
talent. Other answer options such as ambition were ranked by youth to have much less
impact on “success in modern life.”56 This suggests that youth in 2011 may have had low
internal motivation to pursue a successful career, because personal ambition was viewed
as an insignificant predictor of success. Levada’s most recent comprehensive study
shows that this has changed. In 2019, youth were asked to rank the importance of having
a successful career on a scale of 1 to 5, with 1 being “not at all important” and 5 being
“very important.” The average rating was 4.52.57 While the questions are not the exact
same, this still allows for some level of comparison, and I can conclude that between
2011 and 2019, Russian youth experienced an increased desire to have a successful
career.
Issues of emigration, labor mobility, and population decline were other economic
issues addressed in the 2013 Strategiia. Unfortunately, questions about desire to
emigrate58 and family planning were not posed by the Levada Center to youth in
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2011. However, such topics were examined in detail in 2019, and youth responses
provide insight into the current state of these issues. When those who indicated a desire
to emigrate were asked to indicate their reasons why, “improvement of standard of
living” and “experiencing a different culture” were ranked the highest. Much lower on
the list of results were “higher salaries” and “better employment
possibilities.”59 Additionally, when asked later on about trust of Russian political
institutions, those who indicated the strongest desire to emigrate also were found to have
more distrust of governmental institutions, political leaders and parties, and greater
dissatisfaction with the state of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, when
compared to their peers who indicated either lesser or no desire to emigrate.60 Therefore,
even though 50% of youth expressed some level of desire to emigrate,61 career concerns
are not the most salient. With this being an issue that the Russian government in 2013
wanted to address, we can identify a correlation between the state’s focus on developing
youth career opportunities, and the low influence of salary and employment possibilities
on youth’s desire to leave the country for a prolonged period of time.
As discussed in Chapter One, the Putin regime has a desire to have more youth
get married and have children, specifically 2 or more. These topics were not surveyed in
the Levada Center’s 2011 study, but rather asked in 2019 because the 2013 policy
expressed great concern about low birth rates and population decline. Looking at the
survey results, youth attitudes on this subject are congruent with those of the
government. As of 2019, 88% of youth see themselves married eventually, and 95.5% of
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them see themselves married with their own family, as opposed to married without
children.62 Moreover, 46% of respondents ages 25-29 are already
married.63 Additionally, 73% of women and 70% of men imagine themselves with two
or more children. Almost 50% of respondents indicated only two, but overall youth
desire to have multiple children is in line with the government’s ideal plan for population
growth.
Political involvement, traditional values, and trust in the state are topics that were
of greater importance to the Russian government in iterations of youth policy before
Strategiia, but are still discussed in the 2013 policy. Young people’s level of trust in
government has been examined by researchers at the Levada Center throughout time, and
this data provides a look at how youth opinions on political issues and trust in political
institutions has changed after the adoption and implementation of the 2013 Youth
Strategy. “Political institutions” in these surveys refers to political parties, the State
Duma, the Russian government generally, and the president. The 2011 study provides
data from youth answers in 2009 and 2011 to the question “do you trust…[political
parties, the State Duma, the government administration, the president.]” Answer options
for each of these questions were “I trust” and “I don’t trust.” In 2009, the following
percentages of youth indicated trust in political parties, the State Duma, the
“government,” the president: 22%, 47%, 62%, and 80%.64 The same questions were
asked in 2011, with more variety in answer options, and adding the percentages of
respondents who answered “I fully trust” and “I rather trust,” for the institutions (in the

62

Gudkov, Lev et al., Russia’s ‘Generation Z,’ 105.
Ibid, 104.
64
Gudkov, Lev et al., Molodezh’ Rossii, 59.
63

47

same order) gives the following numbers: 19%, 22%, 36%, and 63%.65 This data
provides a basis for comparison of youth trust in political institutions over time. In two
years, youth trust dramatically decreased, and this downward trend has continued over
time, albeit with a generally less significant drop between 2011 and 2019. In 2019, only
8% of youth respondents indicated that they “trust very much” or “more likely to trust”
political leaders generally.66 When it comes to more specific institutions, the percentage
of respondents who indicated trust in the president was 44%, 26% for government, 24%
for the State Duma, and 16% for political parties.67 This data is more clearly visualized
in the following table:

Trust in...

2009

2011

2019

Political parties

22

19

16

State Duma

47

22

24

Government

62

36

26

President

80

63

44

Political Leaders

8
Figure 4

Like in policy documents, traditional values are an area of focus for opinion
polling of Russian youth. As discussed in Chapter One, this includes things such as
views of Russian figures, historical and contemporary, and valuing patriotism and
national identity. In both Levada surveys, the statement “Russia is for Russians” is
addressed. Agreement with this statement is having the belief that true Russians are only
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those who “have Russian blood running through their veins.”68 In 2011, respondents are
asked to indicate their level agreement with “Russia is for Russians” by selecting one of
the following five answer options: “I support it, it is high time to implement it; It would
be nice to implement it, but within reasonable limits; Negative, this is actual fascism;
This does not interest me; I find it difficult to answer.” 43% of youth selected the second
answer, that it would be nice to implement the idea but with reasonable limits, and 25%
indicated they believe that is a fascist idea.69 In 2019, this changed, and more youth
expressed disagreement with that idea than agreement. Those ages 14-17 expressed the
most disagreement,70 at 47% compared to 31% who agreed. Interestingly, this gap
tightens in those who are older, percentages of disagreement and agreement are as
follows: 42% and 30% in 18-20 year olds, 42% and 37% in 21-24 year olds, and 37% and
37% in 25-29 year olds.71 Levada explains that those who are older place more value on
the “traditional concept of nation,” whereas youth born in the 2000s “support ethnic
diversity and predominantly disagree with discriminatory statements.” This shows how
youth opinions have changed over time. Putin’s regime expresses a desire to support
patriotic sentiment among youth, the idea of which in Russia means support for the state,
notably the Putin regime, as well as support for Russian civilization, and Russian
culture. In scholarship, this is referred to as “civic nationalism.” This is separate from
the ethnic nationalist idea that “Russia is for Russians.”
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Today’s Russian government does not necessarily aim to decrease that nationalist
sentiment, but does express a desire for ethnic minorities to feel welcome and
included. Thus, this move towards encouraging “patriotism” rather than “nationalism” is
congruent with the shift in youth opinions towards ethnic nationalist
statements. Accordingly, youth today get more pride in being Russian from their
citizenship, as opposed to their ethnicity. In 2011, youth were asked to indicate what
identities give them the most pride. Answer options included identities such as being the
parent of a child, the son or daughter of one’s parents, resident of one’s city, specialist in
one’s line of work, being Russian, being a citizen of Russia, a member of one’s
generation, and more. The most common answer was from being a Russian, followed
closely by being the son or daughter of one’s parents, and then a citizen of Russia.72 In
2019, 69% of youth agree with the statement of “I am proud to be a citizen of
Russia,” and youth identify primarily as citizens of their hometowns (86%
agreement). It is also interesting to note that youth from rural communities identified
more strongly with their citizenship, 80% agreeing with the statement “I am proud to be a
citizen of Russia.”73 The Levada Center also makes note of the changes in national and
ethnic identity over time: “When looking into post-Soviet youth, especially older
cohorts, it is particularly interesting to see how national (‘I am Russian’) and ethnic (‘I
am of Russian origin’) identities overlap. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the
Soviet identity quickly started to be replaced with the Russian identity from the top down
and with ethnic identities from the bottom up, leading to a surge in nationalist movements
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in early and mid-1990s.”74 Putin’s approach to youth today is marked by a return to
Russian identity and patriotism, as evident in Strategiia and congruent among youth
attitudes and opinions.
Ultimately, my analysis provides evidence that there is a connection between the
2013 Strategiia and youth attitudes and values. There are of course other influences such
as global mass media, global economic trends, opposition leaders, social media, and
propaganda from the Putin regime. My argument is that policies do have their own role,
and are a contributing factor to changes in youth opinions and values over time.
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CONCLUSION
Throughout this thesis I have explored the connection between the Russian
government’s Youth Strategy in 2013, and youth actual attitudes and values. I also
identify a distinct shift in the Putin regime’s approach to youth and youth issues from
2013 onward. I argue that this is the fourth period of Russian youth policy, with the first
three occurring during the Soviet times, immediately post-USSR, and during Putin’s
early years. In this thesis I have examined the evolution of Russian youth policy,
discussing prior approaches to youth and youth issues, and focusing on the uniqueness of
the 2013 Strategiia. The Putin regime’s current approach to youth is unique in the
amount of attention it devotes to economic issues. Whereas prior iterations of youth
policy had greater focus on ideology and political goals, this policy has more socioeconomic goals. Encouraging traditional views and values is a subject that previously
accounted for large portions of youth policy, but in 2013 only makes up 13.1% of the
document, compared to 43.8% that addresses issues of economic competitiveness.
Strategiia’s primary concern is with the human capital potential of youth, and
aims to better utilize youth as a financial resource for state and society. This intention is
woven throughout the policy, in discussion of topics that are both directly and indirectly
related to economic competitiveness. The Strategy discusses providing youth with more
job training, boosting employable skills and talents, and improving the quality of their
education. Beyond this, the government touches on other topics such as youth criminal
activity, young families, and social services, all of which are still related to the end goal
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of increasing economic competitiveness of the younger generation. This looks
like using anti-drug and other wellness programs to have a more healthy workforce,
providing support for homeless youth so they can become more productive members of
society, and encouraging youth to get married and have several children to produce a
greater population, and therefore more opportunities for economic growth.
I have also discussed the evolution of the sociology of youth in Russia, its origins
during the Soviet Union, and its development into a robust academic discipline. The
Levada Center, a non-governmental sociological polling organization has conducted
examinations of youth and youth values throughout time, from the 1960s up until today’s
Putin Generation. The Levada Center’s opinion polling provides a comprehensive view
of youth attitudes and values, which has been key to my research. I was able to
determine a connection between the 2013 Youth Policy Strategy by looking at the Levada
Center’s study of youth opinions and value orientations in 2011, two years before the
policy was written, and comparing this with their study of youth in 2019-2020, six years
after the policy was written. This time frame allows for implementation of the policy into
society, and thus enabled me to identify connections between the policy and changes in
youth attitudes and values.
Ultimately, there is a connection between youth attitudes and values and Russian
government youth policy youth goals in some topic areas: desire to get married and have
two or more children, desire to have a successful career, and a move away from ethnic
nationalism in favor of patriotic sentiment and welcoming migrants. Conversely, topic
areas where there has been a shift in youth attitudes opposite to the goals of the
government include: satisfaction with education and training programs, and trust in
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political institutions. Overall, my hypothesis that the Kremlin’s youth policies seek to
influence the value orientations of youth and emphasize patriotism, combat population
decline, and prepare them to be agents of economic growth, is confirmed. Moving
forward, the type of analysis that I conducted can be continued for future Russian youth
policies, in order to monitor how the Russian government continues to harness the
ideological and economic potential of generations to come.
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